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I. Introduction
Hypothetical Rule 1. Scope and Purpose of Rules
These rules govern the procedure in the United States
district courts in all suits of a civil nature whether cogniza-
ble as cases at law or in equity or in admiralty, with the
exceptions stated in Rule 81. Except to the extent otherwise
stipulated or directed by order or local rule, ft/hey shall be
construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action.
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Indiana University School of
Law-Bloomington. B.A. 1978, Auburn University; J.D. 1983, Indiana University
School of Law-Bloomington. I would like to thank Susan Robel for helpful
comments on this Article.
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This Article examines a much-exploited aspect of Rule 26:1 Its
explicit authorization for both federal district courts and practitioners
to abrogate its provisions either wholesale by local rule or on a case-
by-case basis.2 While this aspect of Rule 26 bears some resem-
blance to other Rules,3 it is unprecedented in authorizing each
federal district court to excuse all attorneys within the court's
jurisdiction from many of the obligations Rule 26 imposes, particu-
larly that of mandatory early disclosure.4
1. FED. R. CIV. P. 26. The Federal Judicial Center estimates that 52 of the 94
federal district courts have used the authority given in Rule 26(a)(1) to "opt out" of
mandatory disclosure requirements, although 16 of these districts require disclosure
through other local rules and orders or through the Civil Justice Expense and Delay
Reduction Plan. Donna Stienstra, Summary of Actions Taken by Federal District
Courts in Response to Recent Amendments to Federal Rule of Procedure 26, 154
F.R.D. LVII, LXIV (1994). The author concludes, "At this time few of the fifteen
largest districts, as measured by number of judgeships, are fully implementing Rule
26(a)." Id. Other observers state that as of October 1, 1994, "only 19 of the 94
federal districts, representing just 19 percent of the federal courts' 1993 caseload, had
fully implemented Rule 26(a)(1)." Randall Samborn, Districts' Discovery Rules
Differ, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 14, 1994, at Al, A25 (citing research by Alfred W. Cortese
Jr. and Kathleen L. Blaner).
2. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1) (requiring initial disclosures "[e]xcept to the extent
otherwise stipulated or directed by order or local rule"); id. 26(f) (requiring a meeting
of the parties "[e]xcept in actions exempted by local rule or when otherwise
ordered"). The Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 26(a) also state that "[tihe
enumeration in Rule 26(a) of items to be disclosed does not prevent a court from
requiring by order or local rule that the parties disclose additional information without
a discovery request." Id. 26(a) Advisory Committee's Notes.
3. For example, Rule 29, expanded in 1993, is superficially comparable to Rule
26 in that it permits lawyers to modify the formalities associated with depositions and
to stipulate to departures from other discovery procedures. Id. 29. Likewise, Rule
16(b) is superficially comparable to Rule 26 in that it allows courts to identify
categories of cases and then excuse the cases from obligations imposed by that Rule.
Id. 16(b).
4. Rule 26(a)(1) is not the only part of amended Rule 26 that allows "local
options." Rule 26(a)(2), which addresses expert disclosure, allows the court to vary
the requirements by order in individual cases, although apparently not by local rule.
Id. 26(a)(2). Rule 26(b)(2), on the other hand, specifically allows courts to vary by
local rule the limits on interrogatories and depositions imposed by the Federal Rules.
Id. 26(b)(2). Rule 26(a)(4) also allows courts to excuse litigants by local rule from
the requirement of filing disclosure materials. Id. 26(a)(4). Furthermore, Rule 26(f)
allows courts to exempt categories of cases by local rule from the meet-and-confer
requirement of that section. Id. 26(f). And finally, Rule 26(d) allows courts to use
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Historically, a set of uncontroversial principles guiding proce-
dural decisionmaking would certainly have included the goal of
uniformity in national procedure.' While many recent articles
demonstrate the gap between uniformity as a goal and a practice,6
I nevertheless find startling the explicit rejection of the uniformity
principle in the text of a civil rule regulating lawyers' work. I find
this abandonment especially surprising with respect to Rule 26(a)(1)
because it suggests a lack of commitment by the Advisory Commit-
tee to a controversial rule and because it represents starkly the lack
of consensus about even the most fundamental aims of our proce-
dural system.7
local rules to eliminate the requirement that parties forebear from other discovery
before the Rule 26(t) conference. Id. 26(d).
5. As Professor Shapiro has noted, "While there is no doubt of the importance
attached to the development of rules of nationwide application in the federal courts,
there was some question, at least at the outset, about how comprehensive these rules
should be." David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice
of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1973 n.7 (1989). Judge Weinstein has
argued that "the drafters of the Rules did not deify uniformity"; rather, he believed
that the drafters "employed uniformity and simplicity as tools to cultivate smooth
substance-oriented litigation," and noted that there were "numerous permissions for
local imagination" in the original rules. Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised? 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1901, 1911 (1989). But the local permissions that Judge Weinstein cited,
id., are not comparable to current Rule 26: Rule 40, which permits local scheduling
systems, closely resembles Rule 16, which allows local courts to determine which
cases will receive serious management efforts. Both of these Rules primarily concern
docket management, not regulation of attorney practice.
6. See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules:
Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1999, 2020 (1989) (discussing the work of the Local Rules Project); David M.
Roberts, The Myth of Uniformity in Federal Civil Procedure: Federal Civil Rule 83
and District Court Local Rulemaking Powers, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 537, 539
(1985) (discussing the threat local rules pose to uniform federal procedure).
7. Many proceduralists have noted that civil procedure stands on shaky normative
ground these days. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science,
or Crumbling Construct? Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 659, 759 (1993) (concluding that consensus in the Federal Rules has
crumbled); Gene R. Shreve, Civil Procedure: Other Disciplines, Globalization, and
Simple Gifts, 92 MCI-. L. REv. 1401, 1407 (1994) (noting that many civil procedure
scholars have questioned whether they can agree on the nature and direction of civil
procedure).
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In this Article, I examine the Advisory Committee's justification
for allowing local courts to reject a national procedural rule.
Although I acknowledge the validity of some of the Committee's
concerns, I recommend a more cautious and nationally-uniform
solution. We need a deeper understanding of when, if ever, such
"local option rules" are appropriate and what we can expect them to
accomplish. Ultimately, we can only achieve this understanding by
acquiring a coherent vision of the goals of our national procedural
system.
II. Advisory Committee Justification for Optional Rules
The Advisory Committee's Notes advance a number of explana-
tions for allowing local courts to "exempt all or particular types of
cases from these disclosure requirements or to modify the nature of
the information to be disclosed."
First, the Advisory Committee suggests that mandatory
disclosure might be inefficient in particular categories of cases.9
Thus, it invites courts to identify classes of cases "in which
discovery would not be appropriate or would be unlikely."1" The
Committee points to social security review and government collec-
tion cases as examples of these classes of cases."
The suggestion that courts can locally identify categories of
cases for which abbreviated procedures suffice is not unique to Rule
26. For example, Rule 16(b) allows local courts to identify case
categories for exemption from the scheduling order requirement,' 2
just as Rule 26 permits local courts to identify categories of cases in
which the cost of compliance with an across-the-board disclosure
requirement would outweigh the benefits.3
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) Advisory Committee's Notes. I will not discuss the
Rule's authorization for judges and litigants to tailor the disclosure requirements to the
needs of the individual cases; I do not view this aspect of Rule 26 as a dramatic
departure from previous discovery practice. See, e.g., id. 29 (allowing party
stipulations to modifications of discovery practices).
9. Id. 26(a)(1) Advisory Committee's Notes.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. 16(b).
13. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1); id. Advisory Committee's Notes.
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The decision to leave the selection of case categories to local
courts is "a curious provision"14 in light of both past experiences
with Rule 16(b) and the differences between management .and
discovery. After examining local rules that exempt case categories
under Rule 16(b), I am unconvinced that local identification of
categories under that Rule is necessary. Most courts agree about
exempted case categories under Rule 16(b)"5 and the exceptions to
this consensus are not obvious candidates for exclusion under the
Advisory Committee's rationale of exempting cases based on
simplicity of issues.' 6 Nor do all courts share the Advisory
Committee's reasoning for exclusion. For instance, one court
implemented broad rules that categorically exclude complex cases. 17
Experience under Rule 16 suggests two lessons for Rule 26.
First, even with some guidance on operative principles for exclusion
under Rule 16(b), courts can make idiosyncratic choices that may
well reduce the usefulness of the Rule. Thus, the bare-bones cost-
benefit analysis suggested in the Advisory Committee's Notes to
Rule 26 is unlikely to ensure that local courts will be able to identify
those categories of cases-if they exist-that do not require discov-
ery."S Second, the consensus that eventually developed under Rule
16(b) suggests that the Committee itself could identify categories for
exclusion on a principled basis rather than leaving category selection
14. ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND
LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 22 (describing Rule 16(b)'s authorization for local courts to
exempt categories of cases from the scheduling order requirement). Professor Miller,
the Reporter for the Advisory Committee for Civil Rules at the time of the 1983
amendments, noted that "[w]e anticipate that prisoner petitions, odometer cases, and
certain social security cases will be the exempted categories, and there may be
differences from district to district as to what is exempted." Id. at 23.
15. For instance, actions by pro se litigants, social security appeals, prisoner
petitions, and forfeiture actions have all been popular categories for exemptions.
16. For instance, one court exempts "environmental matters" from pretrial
procedures under Rule 16. N.D. ILL. R. 5.00(xi); another court exempts employment
discrimination cases, S.D. GA. R. 8.2(c); and another court exempts ERISA cases,
E.D. PA. R. 47(6). The only exemption that really appears to reflect some oddity in
local conditions is the District of Alaska's provision exempting "cases filed in the
District other than Anchorage in which travel by the Court to those locations within
the time limit set is not feasible or possible." ALASKA R. 9(c)(11).
17. ALASKA R. 9(c)(9) (noting that "exceptionally complex" cases are exempted
from scheduling conferences and orders).
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 Advisory Committee's Notes.
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to the individual court. If the Committee's understanding of the
needs of Social Security cases leads it to believe those cases should
be excluded from mandatory disclosure requirements, as suggested
in the Notes,19 why should it make any difference whether the case
is filed in Maryland or in Georgia? Facing this issue at the national
level, rather than leaving it to local courts, would increase the
likelihood that the problems of cost and delay that the Rule was
intended to alleviate would be addressed in a coherent fashion by a
group with the broad perspective and the resources to determine
prudently which kinds of cases would not benefit from early
disclosure. It is unclear how local courts are supposed to identify
these categories, or why they should be required to do so. z"
My skepticism regarding local courts' ability to make these
determinations on a consistent basis is compounded by the differ-
ences between discovery and scheduling. Discovery, and mandatory
disclosure in particular, differs from scheduling in its greater
potential to impose costs on litigants. It is disturbing that local
courts must identify categories of litigants who will be spared these
potential costs with no more guidance than a statement about cost-
benefit calculations.21 Mandatory disclosure may decrease costs,
as its proponents hope,22 or it may increase costs, as its critics
fear.3 But I see no basis for allowing local autonomy on the
19. Id.
20. If the Advisory Committee's rationale for leaving the question of Rule 16(b)
case exemptions to local courts was that local judges can best determine where to
allocate their resources, leaving this decision to the district courts might make sense,
although one would then be concerned about how judges make these resource-
allocation choices on a class-based basis. Without more guidance from the Advisory
Committee on what factors to consider in allocating those resources, however, the
Rule still produces idiosyncratic decisions at the local level.
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 Advisory Committee's Notes.
22. William W. Schwarzer, In Defense of "Automatic Disclosure in Discovery",
27 GA. L. REV. 655, 663-64 (1993).
23. Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to
Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 44-46 (1992).
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question of which categories of litigants will ultimately discover the
tt24
The complexity of the case also affects discovery differently
than it affects scheduling. The Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule
26(a)(1) suggest that in permitting local courts to identify categories
for exclusion the Committee was again considering only the simple
case.' So while the disclosure requirements seem tailored for the
simple case, critics claim that the requirements are the most
problematic in the complex case.26 Yet one court attempting to
identify case categories did so for inclusion in disclosure require-
ments rather than exclusion; that court chose medical malpractice,
24. One might argue that given the disagreements on basic points about the
consequences of the Rule between proponents and critics of mandatory disclosure, the
opt-out procedure is a good compromise allowing for experimentation that may prove
the truth or falsity of many of the disparate claims. Even if one holds high hopes for
empirical evaluations of procedural proposals, see, e.g., Laurens Walker, A
Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455
(1993) (arguing for empirical testing of proposed rules), we should not be hopeful of
resolving basic empirical questions through the nationwide experiment imposed by
Rule 26(a)(1). Mandatory disclosure has been implemented in too many varieties,
with differing levels of judicial commitment to the schemes adopted, and with no
mechanism to gather useful information about the rule's operation. For a proposal to
examine the rule empirically, see Carl Tobias, In Defense of Experimentation with
Automatic Disclosure, 27 GEO. L.REV. 665 (1993).
25. "It is expected that courts would, for example, exempt cases like Social
Security reviews and government collection cases in which discovery would not be
appropriate or would be unlikely." FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(1) Advisory Committee's
Notes; see also Schwarzer, supra note 22, at 657 ("It is in the universe of the routine
cases where disclosure is intended to have its principal effect."). The simplicity of
the case also guides the application of Rule 16(b). See supra notes 15-16 and
accompanying text (discussing the effect of case complexity under Rule 16(b) and
giving samples).
26. See Bell et al., supra note 23, at 42-43 (describing the difficulties of
complying with disclosure requirements in products liability cases); Ralph K. Winter,
Foreword: In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 263, 275-76 (1992)
(describing the hostility of products liability attorneys to automatic discovery in
complex cases). For an application of a mandatory disclosure rule in just such a
context, see Scheetz v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 628 (D. Mont. 1993)
(ordering disclosures in a products liability case).
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personal injury, employment discrimination, and civil RICO27
claims,28 all of which can be quite complex.
In addition to allowing courts to excuse categories of cases from
mandatory disclosure, Rule 26 permits courts to reject the disclosure
requirements altogether.29 The Committee justifies this provision
by noting the need to accommodate different disclosure requirements
adopted by some courts as part of their Civil Justice Expense and
Delay Reduction Plans30 under the Civil Justice Reform Act
(CJRA). 31 The exemption is ironic, for while many courts adopted
disclosure provisions in their Plans, the majority modeled their
provisions after a version of the disclosure requirement that was
advanced, and later rejected, by the Advisory Committee. 2 Thus,
27. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
1968 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
28. D. DEL. R. 26.2(a).
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1).
30. Id. 26 Advisory Committee's Notes.
31. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. V 1993).
32. The early version of the Rule is found in Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Proposed Rules:
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 87-99 (1991). Professor Tobias
notes that after strenuous criticism of the proposal during the comment period, the
Advisory Committee abandoned the proposal. Carl Tobias, Collision Course in
Federal Civil Discovery, 145 F.R.D. 139, 140-41 (1993). The Committee then
changed course again and revived the proposal in amended form. Id. at 142.
However, by the time the final version of the Rule 26 disclosure requirements were
adopted, many courts had already adopted Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction
Plans in order to comply with one of the early deadlines in the CJRA. Id. Professor
Tobias continues as follows:
Most of the districts adopted procedures covering compulsory predis-
covery disclosure which diverge from the [ultimately adopted] Federal
Rules proposal .... The principal reason why many courts promulgated
procedures which conflict with the new proposal is that the districts
modeled their procedures on the now-superseded articulation requiring
disclosure of information and witnesses bearing significantly on claims or
defenses [which] . . . was the subject of public comment when [those
districts] were finalizing their civil justice plans in late 1991.
Id. at 144.
In fact, all districts received a memorandum from the Federal Judicial Center
suggesting that, as part of the CJRA plan, the districts adopt a local rule based on the
earlier Rule 26 proposal. FEDERAL JUDICiAL CENTER, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
Cwm JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 16 (1991).
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the exemption exists to protect courts that adopted a provision that
the Committee itself rejected.
However, it is not obvious that the CJRA ever authorized courts
to adopt mandatory disclosure provisions. That statute authorizes
"encourag[ing] cost-effective discovery through voluntary exchange
of information among litigants and their attorneys and through the
use of cooperative discovery devices."33 To consider this language
authority to create mandatory discovery devices conflicts with the
statute's language, which encourages voluntary efforts.34 I have
argued elsewhere that the CJRA was generally not intended to
supersede the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that mandatory
disclosure is a dramatic departure from the Rules' previous structure
of attorney-initiated discovery.3" Thus, I do not believe that the
accommodation in Rule 26(a)(1) was required.3 6
33. 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(4) (emphasis added). Given the controversy that
mandatory disclosure generated when advanced by the Advisory Committee, one
might expect some mention of it in the legislative history of the CIRA. The legislative
history does not suggest, however, that anyone believed the CJRA conferred authority
to implement such mandatory provisions. The Senate Report calls § 473(a)(4) "self-
explanatory," stating blandly that "the more voluntary and cooperative the discovery
process can be made to be, the fewer costs will be incurred by all parties." S. REP.
No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 56-57 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802,
6845-46.
34. For a more thorough discussion of the CJRA's authorizing provisions in the
context of disclosures, see Lauren K. Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1447, 1457 (1994).
35. For an extended argument that the catch-all provision in the legislation does
not authorize procedural innovations in conflict with the Federal Rules, see id. at
1464-70.
36. Edwin Weseley recently addressed the question of the relationship between
the CJRA and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, concluding that the "CIRA
trumps the FRCP to the extent the CJRA specifically deals with a particular matter."
Edwin J. Weseley, The Civil Justice Reform Act; The Rules Enabling Act; The
Amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; CJRA Plans; Rule 83-What Trumps
What? 154 F.R.D. 563, 574 (1994). I agree. However, the CJRA grants very
limited and sparing authority to deviate from the Federal Rules, and then only in
carefully delineated cases. See generally Robel, supra note 34, at 1452-54 (noting
CJRA authorization for two minor certification requirements not found in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure at the time the legislation was passed). Thus, a national rule
requiring mandatory disclosure would, in fact, "trump" contrary provisions in CJRA
Plans, since those plan provisions were never clearly authorized by the CJRA in the
first place.
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Be that as it may, the Advisory Committee does not limit its
permission to abrogate Rule 26(a)(1) to districts with alternative
disclosure requirements in place under the CJRA;37 furthermore,
the power to "opt out" of the mandatory disclosure provisions has
not been used only by those districts. 8 The Committee advances
no explanation for allowing courts without alternative provisions to
reject the Rule.39 Courts are presumably free to reject Rule 26 for
any reason at all.
Providing local courts with independence on the issue of
compliance with mandatory disclosure raises serious problems of
fairness and administration. District-wide exemptions allow
litigation advantages and costs to be unevenly distributed based
solely on where filing is available in any given case. While it is
certainly true that there are always advantages to filing or defending
a lawsuit in one place rather than another, one goal of the federal
procedural system ought to be to eliminate regional procedural
differences as sources of strategic advantage. Moreover, attorney
uncertainty about responsibilities under this decentralized system has
never been higher.' Different districts within the same state
follow different rules on basic discovery obligations,41 and vari-
ants-often trivial variants-of the disclosure requirements
abound.42 Within this confusing patchwork, sanctions for failure
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) Advisory Committee's Notes.
38. Stienstra, supra note 1, at LXIV (noting that of the 52 courts that have
rejected Rule 26(a)(1), "sixteen require disclosure through local rules or orders or the
CJRA plan").
39. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 Advisory Committee's Notes.
40. "Now, a year [after enactment of the new discovery rules], many lawyers and
federal judges are still trying to figure out which set of rules applies and how they
operate from one district to another." Samborn, supra note 1, at A25.
41. See, e.g., Stienstra, supra note 1, at LXVIII (noting that the Northern and
Southern Districts of Indiana are operating under different disclosure regimes, as are
the Northern and Southern Districts of Illinois).
42. Id. Moreover, the courts have not been particularly careful in adopting opt-
out rules. Many courts have opted out of provisions of Rule 26 that contain no
language authorizing courts to do so. See id. at LXV-LXXVI (listing thirty courts that
have rejected not only mandatory disclosure, but also disclosure of expert testimony
under Rule 26(a)(2), or pretrial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(3), or both). There is
no language in Rules 26(a)(2) or (3) suggesting that local court have the power to opt
out of those Rules.
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to comply with disclosure obligations are quite stiff and include such
measures as the suppression of evidence.43
Thus, whether one agrees or disagrees with the wisdom of
mandatory disclosure, there is little systemic benefit to be gained by
allowing local decisions about whether to require compliance with
Rule 26. Local independence increases uncertainty and creates
opportunities for procedural gamesmanship without providing
corresponding benefits for the goal of deciding cases on their merits.
1I. When Are Local Options Appropriate?
Given the attention focused on discouraging local deviations
from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the last ten years,"
and given the problems with the procedural variations spawned by
Rule 26, is it ever appropriate to permit local courts to abrogate a
national procedural rule?
Advocates for uniform procedure argue that a unified system
decreases litigation costs and improves access to courts by allowing
attorneys to master one body of procedural law. Uniformity also
reduces surprise and encourages deciding cases on their merits.45
As a general matter, it is difficult to argue that the advocates of such
a position are wrong. Moreover, most procedural rules implement
value choices of consequence to the participants in a lawsuit; witness
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) (explaining that a party "shall not.., be permitted
to use as evidence at a trial, at a hearing, or on a motion any witness or information
not so disclosed"). Additionally, the court may impose other sanctions for failure to
disclose, including reasonable expenses, attorney's fees, and the informing of the jury
of "the failure to make the disclosure." Id.
44. See Subrin, supra note 6, at 2023 (1989) (recounting the work of the Local
Rules Project in identifying approximately 800 local rules inconsistent with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure); see also Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act,
28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2074 (1988) (providing greater controls on, and more accountabili-
ty for, local rulemaking).
45. See generally, Subrin, supra note 6, at 2001 ("When the proponents of the
Enabling Act and the Federal Rules talked and wrote about uniformity they either
explicitly or implicitly utilized several interconnected themes: efficiency,
professionalization, federalism or nationalism, effective law application, power, and
polities."). In recounting the arguments for uniform federal procedure in the pre-
Enabling Act period, Subrin notes that for proponents of uniform procedure, "lack
of uniformity exemplified lack of simplicity," which in turn made litigation outcomes
turn on procedural niceties rather than the justice of the cause. Id. at 2005.
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the tremendous battle regarding mandatory disclosure, fought over
disagreements about the nature of a lawyer's duty to her client, the
amount of "adversariness" that is optimal in our system, and the best
way to uncover the truth in a contested matter.46
Therefore, answering the question of whether local option rules
are justified requires a sensitive evaluation of the underpinnings and
goals of a particular rule in the context of the system in which it
appears. We need to explore aspects of the system that might result
in defensible justifications for local variation, such as whether
differences in geography or conditions of court congestion should
affect a rule's application.47  Furthermore, we must explore
suggestions that some procedural issues that are currently viewed as
systemic problems may actually be limited to certain areas or linked
to local legal cultures in ways that might justify local variations.48
46. As Professor Bone has stated,
It is conceivable that some procedural rules, such as Rule 11, might be
designed not only to alter payoffs but also to change more basic prefer-
ences, values, or beliefs so as to encourage lawyers to consider social costs
when making litigation decisions.... Furthermore, some procedural rules
may be justified primarily on the basis of nonconsequentialist values. For
example, a rule, such as a class action notice provision, that facilitates
opportunities to participate in litigation may be based on a fairness norm.
Robert G. Bone, The Empirical Turn in Procedural Rule Making: Comment on
Walker, XXII J. LEGAL STUD. 595, 598 n.8 (1994).
47. I have suggested elsewhere that the range of local conditions, from
"congested and overworked urban courts through the relative quiet of rural courts,
offers the most defensible reason for local variation." Robel, Fractured Procedure,
supra note 34, at 1483-84. But I argued that "[v]ariation in local conditions.., has
little to do with the concerns that result in procedural rulemaking. Rather, it is the
stuff of docket management-how to move cases smoothly from filing to dispositions,
to schedule trials, and to monitor service under chaotic or calm conditions." Id. at
1484.
48. Id. (suggesting that we should explore whether "our national obsession with
discovery control ought to focus primarily on the relatively few jurisdictions where
discovery abuse has proved a problem").
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Additionally, if we delegate procedural decisionmaking to local rules
groups, we need to consider their composition and incentives.49
We also need to secure a clear grasp of what we will achieve
through local variation within a given rule. Beyond protecting
existing variation, for instance, it is difficult to see what purposes
were served by allowing local courts to reject Rule 26(a)(1). The
Committee's rationale for the Rule-decreasing costs and improving
the exchange of information with the goal of simplifying the process
of achieving just results-militates against .making Rule 26 a
candidate for local rejection. If the Committee believes that these
benefits will follow from mandatory disclosure, why should they be
withheld from litigants in many parts of the federal system simply
because some judges and local rules committees disagree with that
judgment?
IV. Conclusion
Perhaps the goal of national uniformity has become so compro-
mised that its continued pursuit is pragmatically unsound. If that is
the case, however, we must proceed carefully to ensure that
permission to create local procedures does not become transformed
into a license for local compromising of important procedural values.
If the rulemakers fail to adequately consider the Rules' underlying
context and values, the hypothetical rule with which I began this
Article may become a reality.
49. See, e.g., Lauren K. Robel, Grass Roots Procedure: Local Advisory Groups
and the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 59 BROoK. L. REV. 879, 884-85 (1993)
(noting that local advisory groups raise the possibility of "a return to the era when
local bars controlled local courts, not only through direct barriers to foreign entry, but
through the arcane nature of local procedure and practice," and reporting on the
composition of advisory groups under the CJRA).
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